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Draft Recommendation
on the consequences of the Madrid NATO summit for the development of WEU's relations with the central
and eastern European countries and Russia
The Assembll',
(t) Welcomrng the fact that NATO, at its Madnd summit, decidcd to open up to central Europe
and. in the first instance, invite three WEU associate partner countnes to nogotiate therr accession to the
Washington Treaty;
(u) Recalling that the European Union rs to take the first spccrfic decrsions concerning enlargement
b1'the end of 1997;
(iit) Fearing that the critena hitherto adopted by both NATO and the European Commission tend to
create an arbitrarl'differentiation betu,een applicant countries that u'ill in practrce give nse to discrimi-
nation;
(O Pointing out nevertheless that in its "Agenda 2000" document thc European Commrssron
assessed all WEU assoclate partners applyrng for membership of the Europcan Union as meeting thc
condrtions required for full participation in the CFSP;
(t) Wishing therefore for all countnes applyrng for membershrp of thc Europcan Unron to open
accession negotiatrons to that effect simultaneousll,;
(rr) Recalhng paragraph a(b) of Recommendation 608 on the eastern drmcnsion of European
secunt\',
(vir) Stressmg that the purpose of cnlargement of Euro-Atlantic and European structures rs to create
a s)'stem offenng peace, stabrlrtl,, securitl,and progrcss rn Europe as a rvhole,
(vtt) Wishing earnestly therefore that there should be greater consistency, betu'een the pohcres on
enlargement follori'ed b1' the Atlantic Alhance and thc European Union and for these first rnrtratrves
tou'ards enlargement on the part of NATO and the European Unron to be follou,ed bi, others, thus
opening the u'av for progressive integration of all apphcant countrres that meet the acccssron crrterra.
(tx) Declaring its resolve to contribute to the Baltic countries' securitl' and defence and to therr pro-
gressive rntegration in all European structures;
(x) Welcomrng the fact that a Charter is rmminentlv to be signcd betx'een the United States and the
three Baltic countries :
(x,) Noting u'ith satisfaction thc signature of an agreemcnt behvcen Russra and Lrthuanra on dehmr-
tatron of the martttme borders betu'een the tu'o countnes. constltutmg an rmportant contrrbutory factor
to strengthening securrtv and stabrlrtl'rn the regron;
(nr) Reiteratrng its rvrsh for the Czech Republic, Hungarl' and Poland to Jorn WEU at the earhest
opportunl[' and for WEU to strengthen rts relatrons urth all the assocratc partncr countries,
(xiu) Wishing Romania and Slovenra to loin European and Euro-Atlantic structures as soon as pos-
siblc. as affirmed at NATO's Madrid summrt;
(nv) Wrshing also for thc Council to clear up any doubts ovcr Slovakra and Bulgaria berng rcgarded
as viable candldates for acccssron to European and Euro-Atlantrc structures;
(rr) Welcoming the Foundrng Act NATO signcd ri'ith the Russian Federation u,hrle strcssing the
rmportancc of NATO retaming full frecdom of decrsron about rts oun future development and. in
partrcular, enlargement;
(xrt) Rcrterating tts wrsh for WEU to dcvelop tres of cooperatron urth the Russran Federation and
rccalling m thts comectron the tcrms of Recommendatron 574 onWEU's rclatrons lvith Russia;
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(wu) Regretting. therefore, the lack of substance to the rnformation provided rn the first part of the
43rd annual report of the Council on the devclopment of its relations with Russra and in particular on
the content of proposals put fonvard in that connection by the Russian Foreign Mmister, Mr Primakov,
and as regards the position adopted by the Councrl u,ith regard to those proposals,
(xviit) Noting that an independent and stable Ukrarne is a key factor in the securitl, of central and east-
em Europe;
(xtx) Welcoming, therefore, signature of the Charter between NATO and llkraine and the agreement
betrveen WEU and Ukainc on air transport;
(rx) Concerned to note the major challenges currently posed to central and eastern European coun-
tries' security b1, fundamentalism, terrorism, international crime, drug traffickrng and other forms of
organised crime, and consequentll' to the security and stability of Europe as a u'hole,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COTINCIL
I Invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to acccde to thc modified Brussels Treatl' under
Article XI thereof as soon as a dccrsron has been reached to invite them to accede to the European
Union;
2 Enhance cooperatron rvrth all associatc partner countries applf ing for cntry to WEU and examine
the possrbili['of grvrng them a status analogous ri'ith that of assocrate member under the conditions set
forth in Recommendatron 608;
3. Re-examine its pohcv on enlargement rn accordance lvith the critcrra sct out in Recommendatron
6 I I , paragraph 7, so as to allou' the greatest possrble number of WEU associate partners to accede
4. Ask the European Unron to make thc necessarl'arrangements to enable all WEU associate part-
ners to partrcipate as fully'as possible in CFSP actrvrtres;
5 Set up cooperation programmes rvith the associate partner countries. pa(icularll' rvith Romania
and the Baltrc states. rn the field of security and notably border security,.
6. Support. cncourage and accclerate Romania's and Slovenia's accessron to NATO, the European
Union and WEU,
7 . Make the necessan' arrangements in readiness for the rntegration rnto WEU of representattves of
nerv member countries;
8. Ensure that thc fact that certaln applicant countries will join Euro-Atlantrc organrsatlons more
quickl,v than others docs not lead to an undesrrable drscriminatron against othcr WEU assoctate partner
countrics,
9. Support and encourage Bulgaria and Slovakia in their efforts to achieve rntegration into NATO,
the European Union and WEU;
10. Provrde information on the exchange of vrervs rt had rvrth thc Russran Forergn Affairs Minrster,
Mr Primakov, and anv follou'-up action it rs prepared to take;
I 1. Develop a concept of estabhshrng an svstcm of cooperatron rvrth Russia and Ukrarne over areas
of mutual rnterest as ansmg and keep the Assemblv rnformed m thrs regard,
12 Work tox'ards the conclusron of an agreemcnt bctrveen WEU and Russra srmrlar to that alreadl'
concluded u'ith Ukraine on arr transport,
13. Establish cooperation bctu,een the relevant European institutrons. partrcularll'WEU and the
European Union and therr membcr countnes, and ccntral European countnes and Russta and Ukraine
over terronsm. rnternatronal cnme. drug trafficking and other forms of organiscd crime
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Explan atory Memo ran du m
(submitted by Mr Martinez Casafi, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. The prcture in Europe has completely,
altered: the break-up of the Soviet Union, the
disappearance of communism and the dissolution
of the Warsalv Pact, the Wcst's norv irreversible
decision to enlarge its main institutions eastwards
and fresh prospects of close cooperation lvith
countries that rull not.;oin NATO, WEU or thc
EU have clearll,brought about radical changes in
the European polrtrco-security context. Neu,
geostrategic realities and balances have emerged
and these, rvhile thcl' may n'ell contributc to
peace, could equally' become a source of neu'
dangers and serious misunderstanding. Thc es-
sential thing nou'therefore, m your Rapporteur's
vierv, is to create a ne\\' European security area
that rvill providc a frameu'ork for close coop-
eration both in NATO, the EU and WEU, and
also betrveen members of those three westem
politico-securrry' organisations and the other
southern and eastern European countries. In so
doing thc role of the European Union and of rts
defence component, WEU, could prove vital. It
might be sard that membershrp of the European
Union should of rtself be suffrcient to enhancc thc
feeling of secunty' expcrienced by its member
countnes, rnasmuch as accessron to the third prl-
lar represents an initral guarantee, not sufficrent
in rtself perhaps, but real nevertheless, for the
countries involved Moreover thrs secuntl'
drmension of the EU rs recognised by thc Amerr-
cans. as rs clear from press statements made by
Mrs Albnght. u'ho early, in the vear suggested
accesslon to the European Union b1, the Baltic
states as a means of strengthening therr stabrlrtl'
and securiS' Furthermore, the European Union
and WEU can. bv all accounts, play a crucral
part in improvrng the West's relationshrp rvith rts
partners and neighbours to the east and south,
given that for reasons that are cssentrally historr-
cal and cultural. u'estem Europe very often has a
better receptron in countrres that do not rcgard
themselves as belonging to the "u,estern" famrll'
of nations
2. Moreover, as far as Europe's relative
po\\,er rvithrn the Atlantic Alhance is concerncd,
it must not be forgottcn that the European alhes'
notorious "weakness", their feeling of being the
junior partner relative to the Americans. ls
clearly due rathcr to their oim disunrtv than to
any real lack of polver. A more united Europe
would, in your Rapporteur's vierv, constitute a
very porverful lobby rvithin NATO and one that
could not fail to command respect from rts
transatlantic allies, thereby rnfluencing the
West's decrsions in favour of a European world
viov rvhich, although not different from that of
the Americans in any signrficant respect, can
nevertheless boast a far longer histoncal tradrtron
and, arguabll,, reveals a profounder arvarcness of
the contment in rvhich u'e live and of our imme-
drate neighbours.
II. The decision taken in Madrid
3 NATO's decrsron, taken in Madrid on 7-8
July 1997, to enlargc and to invite three coun-
tries, the Czech Rcpublic, Hungary and Poland,
to begin accession negotiations, accompanred by
the promise that no othcr applicant that met given
oblectrve criteria u,ould be ruled out and that a
degree of prrority u'ould be grven to applicatrons
from Romania and Slovenra, undeniably marks
the end of an era, srnce, for the first time, coun-
tries long regarded as SovreJ Union satellites are
now rn principle accepted for membership of the
USSR's erstwhrle adversary'. the Atlantrc Alli-
ance Thc fact that the accession process for
those countries has not met with categoric op-
posrtron from the Russian Federation, the main
successor state to the Sovret Union, but could
rather be described as having its unspoken
agreement, mercll' adds to the hrstoric signifi-
cance of the event Moreover, grven that the
European secunt)'picture is far from final and
the Madnd Declaration clearly leaves room for
hoping that therc may be a great deal of mileage
yet in the Atlantic Alhance enlargement process,
your Rapporteur feels that there are grounds for
thrnkrng that NATO's 1999 summrt could prove
a landmark for security and defence, just as the
1997 summit can be regardcd polrtically as a
hrstonc turnrng-pornt
4. It rs clear nonethelcss that u-hile the new
European security landscapc that has emerged as
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a result of NATO expansion, together with, mter
alia, the creation of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council, an enhanced Partnership for Peace
arrangement and the signature of the NATO/
Russia Foundrng Act and the NATO/Ukraine
Charter, represents a milestone in Europe's hrs-
tory, such developments are still very far from
providrng solutrons to the problems raised by the
aspirations of certain European countries or the
at times conflicting interests underlying them.
5. Moreover the European Commission's
decision, w'hich n'ill almost cerLamly be ratified
by the European Council in Luxembourg in
December, to invite six countries (the Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia) to begin ncgotiations in Januarl' 1998
on future accession to the European Union, is
hkely to have an impact on the shape of Euro-
pean securitl, 
- 
the more so in vierv of the fact
that, leaving aside the three central European
countnes that are soon to join the Atlantic Alh-
ance, the polrtical and economic positions of
Slovenra and Estonia. u,hich both hope to accede
to NATO as soon as possiblc, are considerablv
strengthened bi,the prospect of their berng admit-
ted to thc European Union. In short, rvhrle there
is no question rvhatsocver of applicant countrres
accepting the prrnciple of accessron to the Euro-
pcan Union as a trade-off in the short run for
their not being admitted to NATO, the rdca has
caught on in other circles and even found outright
expression in the vieu's of no lesser person than
the US Secretary of State herself . Furthermore.
it is obvrous that membership of a dl,namic and
prosperous pohflco-economic organrsation such
as the European Unlon carries rvith it substantial
diplomatic and securitv advantages and is, ln an),
event, preferable to the relative isolatron of non-
membershrp of either rnstitution.
6. The purpose of this draft document is not
to make a detailed studv of the current situatron
in Europe or even to offer an analysis of WEU's
relations u-ith eastern European countnes as a
rvhole or r.l,ith thc ten associate partner countrres.
Rather, characterrstic examples of countries of
malor polrtical standing, such as Russia and
Ukraine, have been selected for attentron, to-
gether with the highly spccific case of the Baltic
states. It should be stated here that if Slovakia
and Bulgaria are not discussed in this report, rt is
not due to any lack of recognition of their unde-
niable political and strategic significance, or of
their prospects of in future becoming full mem-
bers of the West's major security instrtutions. In
that optic, we rvelcome the securitv agreements
the WEU Council concluded in April rvith Bul-
garia and Slovakia. While we make no attempt
here even to outhne the positions of these two
associate partners, it is perhaps worth noting at
this juncture Bulgaria's remarkable effort to re-
structure its economy and Slovakia's tangible
progress as far as both its economv and the re-
organisation of its armed forces are concerned.
It should also be recalled that these trvo countries
are active participants in the Partnership for
Peace programrne and keen associate partners in
WEU. Furthermore, the need to grasp the nettle
of the mternal restructuring required of a WEU
made up 28 countries (comprising full and asso-
ciate members, associatc partners and observers)
as a result of the rmminent change in the status of
a number of them and rn the hght of new inter-
national crrcumstances forms the second part of
thrs brief overvlc\\' of the vast subject of Euro-
pean secunt1,, and the need for Western Euro-
pean Unron to adapt to the nerv political and se-
cuntv environment rn the continent and within the
Euro-Atlantrc communrty.
III. The chosen three
7 . True to expectatlon, the heads of state and
of governmcnt, meetrng at the Madrid summit,
invited Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
to begrn negotrations u'ith a view to joining the
Atlantrc Alliance in 1999 Gn'en thcir histon,,
geopolitrcal situation, thc far-reachrng cconomrc
reforms the1, havc achreved and the state of therr
armed forces, these thrce countrres werc unanl-
mously fclt to bc readl' to cope u,rth the demands
associated ri'rth NATO accession In addrtion to
thrs bv no means exhaustive list of positive con-
srderations, mentron should perhaps also be madc
of their svstematrc and effectrve endeavours to
improvc the pohtrcal climate and promote re-
gronal cooperation rn central Europe. The agree-
ments signcd betu.cen Hungary, Romania and
Slovakia and betrvccn thc Czcch Republic and
Germany, the formation of loint Polish-Lithua-
nran and Pohsh-Ukrainian pcacekeeprng bat-3 Le Jv[onde,16 Februarv 1997.
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talions and the setting up of the Polish-Lrthua-
nian Assembly can be cited as examples of
praiser.r,orthy initratives to that effect. Some
weeks later the European Union Commission
acknorvledged in its "Horizon 2000" document
that the three nations, together rvith Slovenia,
Estonia and Cyprus, were economically and pol-
itically ready'to embark upon the long and often
diffrcult negotiations leading to European Union
entr)'.
8. The three "front-runners" among the
countries applying for full membershrp of West-
ern politico-militarl, structures are of course rc-
quired to make efforts on man)' different fronts
As far as the Atlantrc Alhance is concerned, this
first involves taking the necessarl' stcps to ensure
forces interoperabilitl' rvith NATO (particularly
as far as communicatrons and command systems
are concerned) and gradualll' modernising their
equrpment According to the latest and as yet
unconfirmed Amencan estimates, thc total cost
of essential ad;ustments to enable thc three coun-
tries accede to the Alhance u'ould be around 35
billion dollars over the next ten l,earso Of that,
again according to Amencan sources. the three
neu' members' contnbutlons are likell- to account
for some 16 or 17 billion. The financial effort
expected of those countries is therefore quite
substantial even though, according to other estr-
mates, those prepared by the Atlantic Alliance
for instance, the direct cost could prove to be
considerably' less than those figures5 Over and
above that there is the far larger and more com-
plex adjustment needed for therr integration rnto
European Union structures 
- 
although the trme
allowed them rn thrs case rs much longer than for
loining the Atlantic Alliance Sceptrcs repeatedly
make the pornt that although the polrtrcal elrtes rn
the Czech Republc. Hungary and Poland are
unanimous rn stating that thel' arc prepared to
take on the burden oftheir countries' rntegration
into Euro-Atlantrc structures. the urder public in
the three countrres. rvhrle clearly rn favour of
drarving closer to the West, u'ould appear to bc
indifferent or ill-rnformcd about the economrc
fall-out that could result in the earl1, stages of
membershrp of the malor polrtical and securrty
a Internahonal llerald Trtbune,30 Septembcr 199'7
5 The NATO Secretan'-General's address to the
North Atlantic Assembll', l3 October 1997 andThe
Financial Ttmes, 22 October 1997
organisations of the West and hence not readl' as
1'et for the economic sacrificcs that are almost
cerLain to prove necessarl,6. To be fair, one
should add nevertheless that this seeming indif-
ference of the rvider pubhc to the immediate con-
sequences of Atlantic Alhance and European
Union accessron could u'ell reflect a convictton,
very widely held in eastern Europe. that member-
shrp of western institutions u'rll, strategicalll,
speaking. reap an extremelv posltlve harvest in
the longer run by strengthening their political
position internatronally and consohdating both
national and regional security, not to mention the
very rvelcome economic spin-offs rt rvill un-
doubtedly'bring
9 The thrcc future mcmbcrs of the Atlantic
Alhancc and the Europcan Uruon are, like other
associate partncrs, applying for membcrshrp of
Western European Unron and, stnce they are
countries that obviousll, rvill, rvithin a relatively
short time, mect both NATO and European Un-
ion membership conditions. WEU must be ready
to rvelcome the Czech Republic. Hungary and
Poland in the near future Furthermore tt ts clear
that bringing these three countrres. wrth therr
western tradrtrons and commitment to the West,
into WEU rvill obviousl), considerabll' strengthen
the Organisation and breathe neu' life into it It is
essential to consider further rvhethcr. under pres-
ent circumstances, some rethinking of the "Cahen
doctrine" mrght not be rn order so as to avoid
having to rvait untrl thel,become full members of
the European Union 
- 
a process rvhrch could take
up to four or five )'ears - beforc Western Euro-
pean Union can be enriched by their presence.
Might rt not rather be preferable to invite the
three countnes to join \\'EU as full members
once a political decisron has been reached on
their entrl'to the European Unron?
IV. Romqnia and Slovenia
l0 An rmpressive diplomattc tour de force
and the support of virtualll' all NATO's Euro-
pean members farled. in the face of Amcrican
opposition, to influence the outcome of the Mad-
nd summit rn favour of a decrsron to includc
Romarua rn thc first group of ne\\-entrants. The
final communiquc, rn refernng to the progress the
country had achreved and affirmrng that the Alli-
u Survey published n Le lrIonde,8 Jull' 1997
DOCUMENT I585
ance might take in more members in the rela-
tively near futurc, gave room for hope that Ro-
manra's efforts might be rervarded in the next
rvave of enlargement.
I l. Since the change of government in the
country, Romania has also embarked on a pro-
grarnme of reform dcsigned to set up nov struc-
tures, rapidly liberalise the economy' and bring it
into line rvith u'estern standards. Holvever, the
European Commission rn its landmark document
"Horizon 2000", has takcn the vierv that, from an
economic point of vierv, Romanra is not y'et readl'
to enter into accessron negotiations rvrth thc
European Uruon, but has encouragcd it to keep
up the good rvork.
12 There is a general fceling in European and
Euro-Atlantic circles that the time rs almost ripc
for Romarua to accedc to NATO membership, in
vierv of the fact that it rs thc second-largest
country in the region after Poland in terms of the
size of rts population and arml', and of rts active
expenence in the defcnce of the nation, its hrghl1,
active involvement in the Partnership for Peace
and in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement op-
crations (Bosnia and Albania being trvo typical
examples), its skrlful drplomacl, and support
from its fnends m Europe The United States
President clearll, intimated as much during his
vrsrt to Bucharest in July a feu- days after the
Madrid summit The NATO Secretary-General
also made encouraging noises before the North
Atlantic Assembll' on 22 October. Horvever Ro-
mania's accessron to the European Union, a
u,holll' realistrc arm in the longer term, rvill re-
quire a lcngthier adjustment period and more
complex negotiation Thrs does hos,ever rarse
the point as to rvhv the European Unron should
not convev a polrtical message of encouragement
to Romania and others b1'opening acccsston ne-
gotratrons u'rth them. makrng rt clear nonetheless
that as thev represent the "tougher cases", extra
effort rs needed to bring them into hne u'ith
European Unron standards. In order to be able
fully to appreciate the countrl,'s lrrrmensc politi-
cal and economic srgnrficance, your Rapporteur
feels that mention should be made of the tnlatcral
cooperation prograrnmes in rvhrch Romania is
involved rvith a number of other countries in the
reglon (urth Austna and Hungar1,, Bulgaria and
Grecce and so on), its esscntral role vis i vis thc
natrons rvithin the Black Sea regional frameu'ork,
its increasing cooperation u'ith lJkrarne and its
position as a country authorising transit through
its territory of oil from the Caspian Sea and cen-
tral Asia, bound for central and u'estern Europc.
13. From WEU's point of vierv, Romania is
obviouslv a pou'erful alll' and a major partner.
Wrth its commitment to Europe and the Wcst,
dominant geostrategic posrtion to the north of the
Balkans and east of central Europe, sizcablc
armed forces, defence industry, the Romanian
armcd forces' highll, active participation in
peacekeeprng and peace-enforcement operations
and the Romanian delegatron's equally active
involvcment in all aspects of thc u'ork of the
Council and the Assembly, there can be no doubt
that Romanla, as a full member of WEU, u,ould
add to the strength of thc Organisation and
breathe nerv life into thc European defence cause.
The vanous WEU bodies should therefore, in mv
vieu', strenuousll, support Romanra's efforts to
become incorporated into European defence
structures as quickly as possrble and use the
u'crght of therr mfluencc to convrnce the Euro-
pean Unron and NATO to speed up its accessron
to thosc tu'o major rvestcrn polrtrco-security or-
ganisatrons. Until such trme as Romania bc-
comes a full member of the EU and WEU, it
rvould. in 1'our Rapporteur's opinron, bc most
appropnate, in vierv of the threats to the coun-
tr1"s securitl, by reason of its proximity to far
less stablc areas to the east. for European rnstr-
tutions to consider cooperatron rvith those of
Romania, ri'ith the aim of strengthening securitl'
at the country"s bordcrs and espcciallv along its
coastline.
14. Slovenia, despite all efforts. has not been
rovarded by' berng invrted to jorn the first u,ave
of nerv NATO applicants It has hou,ever had
the satrsfactron of being counted anrong the num-
ber of countries regarded by the Europcan
Commrssion as read1, to begin European Unron
accession negotratrons. Slovenia. as a relatively
small country, long nghtly regarded as thc most
prosperous part of formcr Yugoslavra, u,rth pcr
caprta natronal income on a par u'rth that of
Greece or Portugal, docs not appear to present
malor drfficultres in tcrms of its abrlrtl' to adapt
to rvest Europcan structures. Moreover its geo-
graphrc location. good relations srth rts ncrgh-
bours, actrve rn'i,olvement rn the Partnershrp for
Peacc prograrnme and peacekeeprng and peace-
enforcement actrvities portend that membership
of thc Atlantic Alhance u,ould bnng substantial
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benefits both to the country and to the Alliance.
It is therefore highly likely that it u'ill form part
of the next wave of NATO enlargement, rvhich
as all thc signs suggest, rvill not be long in com-
ing. As far as WEU is concerned, its task is to
build a relationship u'ith its brand-nerv associate
partner, thus contributing to strengthening the
security of a peaceful and responsible countrv,
norv bordering on a far less stable region.
V. Russia
15. Notrvithstandrng the demise of commu-
nism in eastern Europe, the end of the cold w'ar
and the break-up of the Soviet Union 
- 
not to
mention Russia's transitory economic and politi-
cal rveakncss rn the post-communrst period 
- 
a
number of basic aspects relating to this great
country have naturally not changed. The Rus-
sian Federation, given its r,'ast geographic area,
the size of its population and its arvesome eco-
nomic and military potential, and also because of
its historl', is a decisive factor for securrty and
stabilitf in Europe and an essential partner in any
reahstrc attempt to organise a European or Euro-
Atlantrc collective securitv svstem. This great
countrJ', alreadl, engaged for a number of years
in an extensive democratisatron process, over and
above its overriding polrtrcal rmportance today
also constitutes a u'holl1'vrable dralogue partner
u rth the w'est and one that in large measure
shares the politrcal and cultural rdeals the malor
Euro-Atlantrc institutions have long proclaimed.
16 The Atlantic Alliance. aware of the major
polrtrcal and geostrategic rnfluence that Russia
can u'ield 
- 
an rnflucncc rihich has received a
further boost in recent months from President
Yeltsin's recovcn' from rllness, hrs grorving pol-
itrcal strength, the rising star of supporters of
reform u'ithin his government and. last but not
least. the first signs of economic recover!' 
- 
has,
happill' for Europe's future stabilitl'. adopted a
pohcy' of allavrng Russran fears as much as pos-
sible and reached a decrsion that the rnrtial phase
of NATO enlargcment should be accompanied by
a senes of mcasures substantialll' to strengthen
the Alliance's relationshrp urth Russra, at the
same tlme recognising that countrv's specrfic
drfficultres and securing lts taclt acceptance that
NATO. long regarded as rts prime foe, should
norv cxtend to the verl' borders of the former
Sol'ret Union. Thus, rvhen they, met rn Helsrnkr
in late March, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
dreu' up the broad outlines of a charter goverrung
NATO-Russia relations and at the same trme
reached agreement on renegotiating the CFE
(Conventional Forces in Europe) Treat1,, and on
the future conclusion of a Start III agreement,
Russia's greater involvement in G7 meetings and
increased economic aid to that country.
17. The NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in
Pans on 27 May x'as the crystallisation of the
new cooperative relationship at institutional
Icvel, sctting forth, mter alia, principles of the
indivisrbility of the secunty of all the states
u'rthin the Euro-Atlantic community, recognition
of the primacl, of the rule of larv, respect for
human rights and civil hbertres and abstention by
both parties from the thrcat or use of force
against each othcr. A mcchanrsm for consul-
tation and close political and military cooperatron
u,as also envisaged ii'ith the creation of the
NATO-Russia Permanent Council, through
u'hich Russia rs involved in most major decisions
taken by NATO in relation to the securitl, of the
Euro-Atlantic area. but rvithout right of veto
The document also makes provision for renego-
tiatron of the CFE treatl' and no statrorung of
neu, nuclear \\'eapons.
18. Westcrn European Union's politrcal necd
to take account of the nes, realities surroundmg
the mammoth Russran state rs not in question:
nor is the necessitv for some form of cooperatlon
urth that vast country'. Hou'ever the fact remains
that, at present, contacts rvith Russia, rmportant
though thc1, are, lack the sy'stematic character
that an international agreement x'ould confer on
them. It might perhaps be appropnate for WEU
rnstrtutrons to give immediate thought to the
matter. In thrs optrc, it might be lntcrestlng to
have further information on the proposals Mr
Primakov put to the WEU Councrl and on an1'
follou'-up to them.
VI. The case of Ukraine
19. Ukrainc \\'as a part of Russra from 1654.
its sole period of rndcpendent statehood berng
from 1918-1920. For a number of lcars rt
sccmcd to vacrllate bets'een the pro-Russian m-
fluence that predomrnates mainll' rn the eastcrn
part of the countn' and the pro-\\'estern thinkrng
that holds su'a1' largell, rn thc u'est and rn go\'-
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ernment. The situatron was further complicated
by differences betu'een it and its vast Russian
neighbour (over the status of the Crimea, the
Black Sea Fleet and the arrangements over
Sevastopol) rvhich have proved a major set-back
to getting initiatives off the ground on the inter-
national front. Horvever the country now seems
to have emerged from this difficult and irresolute
state and the last ),ear or so has seen a distinct
improvement in Ukrainian-Russian relations rvith
the emergence of a clear pohcy of rapprochement
u'ith the West imbued rvith political realism.
Thus in March 1997, Mr Udovenko, the Ukrain-
ian Minister for Forergn Affairs, described
I-Ikrarne's integration into European and Euro-
Atlantic security structurcs, including NATO, as
one of his countrv's strategic objcctivesT. At al-
most the same time, the Ukrainian ambassador in
Athens, in an address to a colloquy organised by
the WEU Assembly on the future of European
securitr'. confirmed that strategic orientation 
-
although he also addcd that the issue of lIkraine
joining NATO *'ould not arise for at least an-
other ten I'ears and that Ukraine's immediate
polio'objective *,as to conclude a secunty and
cooperation agreement u'ith NATO 
- 
rvhrle
stressrng that the development of good relations
bets'een the Atlantic Alhance and Russia \\,as a
necessary preliminan' for European security8.
Agarn, in a letter to the WEU Presidency, in
August 1996, the Ukrarnran Foreign Minister
requested that relations bettveen hrs country and
the European Union should be strengthened 
-
envisaging inter aha Lkrainian involvement in
WEU-led operations or peacekeeping missions,
L{<rainian obsen'ers affending training exercises,
the appointment of harson offrcers to the various
headquarters and the setting-up of a cooperation
prograrnme betrveen the Torrelon Satellrte Centre
and the Lrkrainian Space Agenc),. A month later,
durrng the WEU Secretarv-General's visit to
Krel'. [Jkrarne requested associate partnership
status in WEU
20. Contacts in all the ccntral European coun-
tries to u'hom vour Rapporteur spoke appear to
agree on one point at lcast. Ukrarne holds the key
to the balance of sccuritl, rn eastern Europe, a
vrerv repcatedly expressed at rvidely drffenng
' Le F,garo,2l March 1997.
' WEU Assembly. Officral record of the colloquy on
enlarged security held rn Athens
levels and for a variety ofreasons. Regarded as a
counterweight to Russia, by others as an example
of a ex-Soviet statc and b1, yet others simply as a
valuable partner, Ukraine is an essential securitv
factor for all 
- 
a country u'hich, in view of its
size, geographic location, political clout and
population is a factor of malor significance in
any serious attcmpt to drau, up a blueprint for
security in central and Eastern Europe
21. The NATO-Ukraine Cooperation Charter
n,as srgned on 9 Jul1, 1997. h included, among
other provisions, arrangements for consultation
betu'een the two parties in the event of an appar-
ent threat to Llkraine's territorial integrity,. It
rvas preceded b1, the signature on 3l May of a
partnership and cooperation agreement rvith
Russia, govcrning. among other matters. the
Crimea question, rncludrng the use of the port of
Sevastopol b1,the Russian Black Sea Fleet, thus
laf ing the basis for normahsation of relations
betu'een the tu'o countnes In the Rapporteur's
vieu', thc virtuallv simultaneous conclusion of
these tu'o agreements dcfinrng the framervork of
Ukraine's relatrons u'rth East and West ahkc is
no comcidence, but rathcr attests to Ukraine's
concern to establish and marntain a balanced re-
lationship u'ith both sides. ri'hilc avoiding becom-
ing a vast buffer statc, a merc "grcv area", bet-
u'een Russra and thc West. The conclusion in
late June of an agreement u'rth WEU on long-
haul air transport also marks a further step in
llkraine's constantlv evolvmg relationship rvith
the Organisation, in an area rvhere, it u,ould
seem, there is strll much to be done
WI. The Baltic states 
- 
the need for an
imaginative solution
22. The three Baltrc countrres appear to be
concerned about therr sccunt\'. on the basrs both
oftherr past historl'and their geographic location
next to a vast country nhrch. ri'hile rt no longcr
presents a direct or indrrect securitv threat to
them today', has on man\ occasions past domi-
nated the entire regron Estonra. Latvia and
Lrthuania's relatrvely' small srzc, therr populatron
structure. charactensed, as far as the first trvo
are concerncd. bv the presence of very large
Russian mmoritics. couplcd u'ith the fact that
Estorua and Latvra also have disputed borders
that are not readrh, defensiblc, are additional
factors contnbutrng to the nsk of destabrlisatron
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For these reasons, the three Baltic nations are
pressing to join the three Westem politrco-eco-
nomic or politico-military organisations (NATO.
the EU and WEU) and regard membership of
such bodies as a major factor m achieving both
international and their own internal stability. It
also explains wh1' vrtualll,the cntrre populatron
of the three countnes has, according to ever)'
opinion poll, come out in favour of this pro-
Western stance.
23. The case of the Baltic states is the onc that
has aroused most criticism of the NATO summrt
decision to invrte only the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland to 
.;om the organisation Ac-
cording to a viov fairll'rvidely held among west-
ern observers, this inrtral enlargement rnvolves
onll,countries that least need a securrty umbrella,
ilhilc othcrs hke Estonia, Latvia and Lrthuanra,
rvhich feel, perhaps u,ith some lustrfication, that
membershrp of Wcstern organisations can guar-
antce thcir indepcndencc. have been ruled out. at
least for the time being. Russia's categorlc op-
posrtion should be mentioned at thrs pornt.
President Yeltsrn, in a letter to President Chnton
dated 20 June 1996, descnbed the idea of anv
NATO enlargement that rncludcd thc Baltic
states as unacceptable, going so far as to suggest
that if it u'ere to occur rt uould w'ipe out the
basrc frameu'ork for stabilitf in Europe, but at
the same time proffcring assurances that Russra
u-ould be prepared to offer them securr[, guaran-
tees. Those mvolved in the Madnd decision u'ere
careful not to rule out an1, applicant, to empha-
srse that the Alliance \\'as open to all democratic
countries and to make reference to Baltic asprra-
tlons to membershrp Nevcrtheless Russran op-
position, coupled u'rth the existence of still par-
tiallv unresolved bilateral drfferences betu'ecn
some Baltic countries and therr vast nerghbour,
lvould appear to be at the root ofthe decisron not
to rnclude them rn the first u'ave of NATO en-
largement.
24 Hou'ever the Wcst does have a degree of
sl.rnpathl' rvrth the Baltrc countnes' determina-
tron to forge the closest possrble tres rvith West-
ern political and secunty structures The Euro-
pean Commission's decision to support Estonia's
apphcation for European Unron accession, the
military cooperation programmes several u'estcrn
countries (Denmark, Frnland. France, Germanr,,
Nonval', Poland, Srvedcn and the Unrted Krng-
dom) havc set up wrth one or other or all thrce
Baltic states and, above all, the nou' stated inten-
tron of the United States, through an agreement
rvith the three countnes, exphcitly to set out tts
support for Estonia, Latvia and Lrthuania's inde-
pendence unilateralll' are rosponses 
- 
partial
maybe but substantral ncvertheless 
- 
to thc ques-
tion of rvhat the West could do, at least in the
first instance, to make those countries feel more
securc.
25. In a report adopted in Junee, the WEU
Assembly drerv attention to the securitl' needs of
the Baltrc states, u'hich have been WEU associ-
ate partners since 1994, and requested the
Council to strengthen cooperatron betrvecn WEU
and those countries and at the same trme lend
encouragement to the resolution of their bilateral
drfficultres u'ith Russia, particularll' as regards
border recognition. Morc specifically, this u'ould
involve. inter aln. organrsing jornt mrlitan' ex-
ercises, strengthening thc Baltic countries' pres-
ence in relevant WEU politico-military bodrcs
and enhancing participation b1, Baltic armcd
forces m tasks undertakcn b1'WEU. Moreovcr,
rt mrght perhaps also be appropnate to envrsage
consultatrons on regional rssues rn ri'hich the
Baltrc states and WEU member countrtes u'ould
take part Improved rclatrons rvrth Russra could
even make it possrble to involve that great coun-
trf in such a process.
WII. ll'EU in theface of the nav
European reality
26 The enlargement of NATO, the concluston
of the Foundrng Act u'rth Russia, the Atlantrc
Alhance's signature of a partnership charter rvith
I-Ikrarne. thc start. rn its turn, of the European
Uruon enlargement process, and the prospect of
an Amencan secunty guarantec for the thrce
Baltic states, coupled ri'rth the legrtrmate asptra-
trons of the other East European and Balkan
states all hrghll' motivated to become prrvrlegcd
assoclates if not cqual partners urth the West,
are all bound to havc their effect on Westcrn
European Union, ri'hrch has a ver]' drffbrent
European polrtrcal and drplomattc landscape to
dcal u'ith than that of a l ear ago There rs a need
to drau' thc rmphcatrons from thrs, takrng thc
e 
"Enlargcd sccunt\ : the sccuntl' problems posed bv
thc enlargement of NATO and thc European
rnstitutrons", Rapporteur: Mr Urbain
t0
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necessary political dccisions and adapting
WEU's intcrnal structures so as to take in the
three nerv members, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary and Poland, that together are to jorn both
NATO and the European Union. Moreover it
u'ill be necessary to initrate a nerv phase of coop-
eration with other countries, rvhose status in
WEU rvill undergo a change as a result of their
accession to the EU or NATO.
27. It must of course be borne in mind that
according to the principles adopted at Kirchbcrg
in 1994, countries rvhich become EU members
rvrthout;oining NATO. at least for the time being
(including Clprus, Estonia and Slovenia) should
be regarded as WEU observers, rvhile those
joining NATO but not the European Union
rvould be associate mcmbers. Although strict
application of those rules does not appear for the
trme bcrng to change the ratronale or content of
WEU's rclations ri'ith its assoclatc partncrs, it
u,ould seem to be desirablc for Estonia and
Slovenia's changed sLatus vis-ir-vrs the EU to
lead to a strengthening of their rclatronship wrth
WEU u-here they have had associate partncrship
status since 1994. Consequently, your Rap-
porteur feels rmaginatron and flexibrlitl, are es-
sential u'hen consrdering the various possible
scenarios and that there is no call to shy au'ay
from departing from the rules lard dou.n in the
Kirchberg Declaratron rf it u'ere the wrsh or m
thc interest ofthe partres concerned.
28. Developing WEU's relatronship rvith
Russia and Ukraine rrould appear to be a malor
aspect of the read.lustment to 
- 
not to sa), change
of drrection in 
- 
WEU's policy, tou,ards eastem
Europe. Thus as far as Russia is concerned, a
highlv forturtous expansion of contacts at various
levels is currently tak-g place (the Secretary-
General's vlslt to Moscou', cooperatton lrith the
Torrejon Satellrte Centre, exchangcs of viervs
lvrth betrveen the WEU Assembly and the Duma,
cooperation between the WEU Instrtute for Sec-
uritl' Studies and the Russran Academy of
Sciences and so on). Hou,ever the absence of
institutronahsed relatrons betu'een WEU and that
great country is, undeniabll,, a shortcomrng that
must be remedied rn ordcr to give the develop-
mcnt of relatrons benveen the largest nation in
Europe and the contment's sole dcfence organi-
satron the impetus that circumstances seem to
demand. Quite a drfferent sltuatron obtains rvrth
regard to Ukraine u'hrch appears to regard deep-
ening relations u,ith WEU as a strateglc ob.;ectivc
of its policl, tou'ards Europe and uhich a year
ago applied to bccomc an associatc partner in
WEU. It rs clear that although that request could
not bc granted for reasons unconnected with the
importance WEU attaches to Ukrame (associatc
partner status is linked to prospcctive accession
to the European Uruon), the relationship is devcl-
oping apace as the recent srgnature (end June
1997) ofthe cooperation agrecment on long-haul
air transport serves to demonstrate.
29. Thrs brief attempt to analvse the apparcnt
nced for internal and cxtcrnal ad.;ustment b1,
WEU to the ncrv prcvaihng conditions would
manifestly be lacking in balance uithout some
mcntion of the nced for the Organisation to rnsti-
tute a policl'torvards eastern European countries
which are not assocrate partners (Albania. Bos-
nia and Hcrzegovina, Croatra, FYROM and pos-
sibly Belarus) but u'hich arc nonetheless tn,ing to
establish somc form of cooperatron x'ith Western
European Union. It is necessary at this stage to
estabhsh the crrtena for such coopcratlon and to
give immediate thought to the form rt mrght take,
especialll in vreu'ofthe fact that several ofthose
countries arc srtuated crthcr rvrthin or immed-
iatell, adlacent to arcas of cnsis and thcreforc
assume ma.;or importance for an organisatron
u'hose task it is to sec that Europe rs secure and
defended.
30 The final aspect to u'hich I should like to
drarv attention here rs the drfficultl' bruving
rvithin WEU rtself ovcr possible changes to the
admission cntena for full membershrp For
years, simultaneous membershrp of NATO and
the European Unron has been a prior condition
for full membership of WEU Houever Ambas-
sador Cahen, a formcr WEU Secretarl,-General,
and the author of the doctrine that bcars his
name, observed. dunng the course of thc collo-
quy the WEU Assemblv organised rn Athens rn
March, that under the present crrcumstanccs rt
might be ncccssar), to consider amending that
doctnne, rn particular to enable apphcant coun-
tries that have alreadv signed up to the enhanced
Partnership for Peace arrangements and ate
mcmbers of the Europcan Union to become full
members of WEU
31. Clearly thercforc. bcl,ond a certarn point,
the criteria formcrll'used to define thc rcspectrve
statuses of thc 28 WEU countries cannot con-
ll
DOCUMENT 1585
tinue to be applied rvithout adjustment to take
account of the new circumstances. Equally obvi-
ous is the fact that the climate intemationally 
-
and especrally in Europe - has recently changed,
allowing WEU, indeed placing an obligation
upon it, to take new political and even institu-
tional initiatives suited to Europe's new political
and military outlook. The search for the neces-
sary solutions calls for open-mindedness and
putting them into practice requires an rndom-
itable political will.
IX. Conclusions
32. Without claiming to forecast the future, we
can confidentll' state that, at the time of writing,
the broad framervork of a new reality in terms of
Europe's secunty' seems already to be in place.
Hence the enlargement by stages of NATO, the
European Union and WEU does not appear to be
causing any maJor ripples in the West's relations
u'ith its neighbours, particularly since NATO's
relations urth both Russia and the Ukraine are
improving as a result of the conclusion of
frameu'ork agreements. These, particularly in
Russia's case, provide for consultations at vari-
ous levels and for enhanced cooperation. Addi-
tionally, the European Commrssion has proposed
entenng into negotiations rvtth six countries 
-
five of them geographically part of central
Europe 
- 
with a vierv to their accession to the
Europcan Union. In a concern to convey a posi-
tive political message to countries wishing to join
the Union, your Rapporteur feels that widening
the accession negotiations to more countries so as
to include all the eastern European applicants,
might be an appropriate gesture 
- 
on the under-
standing that some countries, for entirely justifi-
able reasons, rvill join the EU much later than
others.
33. In the present political context in Europe,
the challenges facing WEU are clear but the list
is a long one. They boil down in essence to pro-
moting European security or rather to contrib-
uting to create a European security area by ac-
cepting new members, strengthening cooperation
with countries u'hich, notu'ithstanding their res-
olve, are not to become members and continuing
to develop friendly relations with eastern neigh-
bours such as Russia and Ukraine while taking
an actrve mterest in events taking place in other
European countries, such as Albania, u'hich
might present a danger to Europe's security.
Last but not least, Europe's own internal cohe-
sron must be strengthened, so as to enable us to
speak rvith one voice on the international stage,
including u'rthin the Atlantrc Alliance. United we
stand drvidcd rve fall, trusm though it may be, is
a saying all too often overlooked where Europe is
concemed
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